Senator Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts
Speech in the Senate, on the proposed Amendment of the Constitution fixing the Basis of Representation, February 5 and 6, 1866.
II.
formal guaranty of a republican form of government.[46] Defiantly they assume that Slavery is not inconsistent with such a government. To this degrading assumption we must reply, not only for the national cause, but that republican governments may not suffer.
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| The caning of Sumner on the Senate floor, by South Carolina representative Preston Brooks, May 22, 1856 |
Believe me, Sir, this is no question of theory or abstraction. It is a practical question, which you are summoned to decide. Here is the positive text of the Constitution, and you must affix its meaning. You cannot evade it, you cannot forget it, without abandonment of duty. Others in vision or aspiration have dwelt on the idea of a Republic, and they have been lifted in soul. You must consider it not merely in vision or aspiration, but practically, as legislators, seeking a precise definition, to the end that the constitutional “guaranty” may be performed. Your powers and duties are involved in this definition. The character of the Government founded by our fathers is also involved in it.
There is another consideration not to be forgotten. In affixing the proper meaning to the text, and determining what is a “republican form of government,” you act as a court in the last resort, from which there is no appeal.
Thee magnitude of the question before us is seen in the postulate with which I begin. Assuming that there has been a lapse of government in any State, so as to impose upon the United States the duty of executing this guaranty, then do I insist that it is a bounden duty to see that such State has a “republican form of government,” and, in the discharge of this bounden duty, we must declare that a State, which, in the foundation of its government, sets aside “the consent of the governed,” which imposes taxation without representation, which discards the principle of Equal Rights, and lodges power exclusively with an Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly, cannot be recognized as a “republican form of government,” according to the requirement of American institutions. Even if it may satisfy some definition handed down from antiquity or invented in monarchical Europe, it cannot satisfy the solemn injunction of our Constitution. For this question I now ask a hearing. Nothing in the present debate can equal it in importance. Its correct determination will be an epoch for our country and for mankind.
You are sole and exclusive judges. You may decide as you please. Rarely in history has such an opportunity been offered to the statesman. You may raise the name of Republic to majestic heights of justice and truth, or you may let it drag low down in the depths of wrong and falsehood. You may make it fulfil the idea of John Milton, when he said that “a commonwealth ought to be but as one huge Christian personage, one mighty growth and stature of an honest man, as big and compact in virtue as in body”;[47] or you may let it shrink into the ignoble form of a pretender, with the name of Republic, but without its soul.
Before considering this vital question, it is proper to regard the origin of this “guaranty,” and see how it obtained place in the Constitution. Perhaps there was no clause more cordially welcomed; nor does it appear that it was subjected to any serious criticism in the National Convention or in any State Convention. It is not found in the Articles of Confederation; but we learn from the “Federalist”[48] that the want of this provision was felt as a capital defect in the plan of the Confederation. Mr. Madison, in a private record, made in advance of the National Convention, and which has only recently seen the light, enumerates among defects of the Confederation what he calls “want of guaranty to the States of their Constitutions and laws against internal violence”; and he then proceeds to anticipate danger from Slavery, which could be counteracted only by such “guaranty.” Showing why this was needed, he says, that, “according to republican theory, right and power, being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous; according to fact and experience, a minority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for the majority”; and he remarks, in words which furnish a key to the “guaranty” afterwards adopted, “Where Slavery exists, the republican theory becomes still more fallacious,”—thus showing, that, at its very origin, it was regarded as a check upon Slavery.[49]
Hamilton was not less positive than Madison. In his sketch of a Constitution, communicated to Madison, and preserved by him,[50] this “guaranty” is found; and in the elaborate brief of his argument on the Constitution,[Pg 140] it is specified as one of its “miscellaneous advantages.” The last words of this remarkable paper are “guaranty of republican governments.”[51] Randolph, of Virginia, in his sketch of a Constitution, proposed the “guaranty,” and, in a speech setting forth the evils of the old system, he said of the remedy, that “the basis must be the republican principle.”[52] Colonel Mason, of Virginia, taking up the same strain, said, that, though the people might be unsettled on some points, they were settled as to others, among which he put foremost “an attachment to republican government.”[53]
The proposition in its earliest form was, “that a republican government, and the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of government and territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State.”[54] This was afterward altered so as to read, “that a republican Constitution and its existing laws ought to be guarantied to each State by the United States.” Gouverneur Morris thought that the proposition in this form was “very objectionable,” and he added, that “he should be very unwilling that such laws as exist in Rhode Island should be guarantied.” On discussion, it was amended, at the motion of Mr. Wilson, the learned and philosophical delegate from Pennsylvania, afterward of the Supreme Court of the United States, so as to read, “that a republican form of government shall be guarantied to each State, and that each State shall be protected against foreign and domestic violence,” and in this form it was[Pg 141] unanimously adopted.[55] Afterward it underwent modification in the Convention and in the Committees of Detail and Revision, until it received the final form it now has in the Constitution:[56]—
“The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, when the Legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.”
Thus stands the “guaranty.” If further reason be required for its introduction into the Constitution, it will be found in the prophetic language of the “Federalist”:—
“It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers?”[57]
The very crisis anticipated has arrived. “The caprice of particular States,” and “the ambition of enterprising leaders” have done their worst. And now the “guaranty” must be performed, not only for the sake of individual States, but for the sake of the Union to which[Pg 142] they all belong, and to advance the declared objects of the Constitution, specified in its preamble.
The text of this great contract is worthy of study. No stronger or more comprehensive words could be employed, whether we regard the object, the party guarantying, or the party guarantied. The express object is “a republican form of government.” This is plain. The party guarantying is not merely the Executive or some specified branch of the National Government, but “the United States,” or, in other words, the Nation. The Republic, which is the impersonation of all, guaranties “a republican form of government”; and every branch of the National Government must sustain the guaranty, including especially Congress, where is the collected will of the people. The obligation is not less broad, when we consider the party guarantied. Here there can be no evasion. The guaranty is not merely for the advantage of individual States, but for the common defence and the general welfare. It is a guaranty to each in the interest of all, and therefore a guaranty to all. And such is the solidarity of States in the Union, that the good of all is involved in the good of each. For each and all, then, this guaranty must be performed, when the casus fœderis arrives. As guarantor, the Republic, according to a familiar principle, is to act on default of the party guarantied; and then the duty is fixed in all its amplitude.
The testimony is complete. This clause was no hasty or accidental amendment, creeping into the Constitution by stealth or compromise, obscure in language and open to various interpretation, but a solemn act, couched in few, lucid, unmistakable words; and its precise purpose was just what so plainly appears,—to[Pg 143] keep all the States truly “republican,” and make the whole numerous people, in the development of the future, homogeneous and one. By these words the Nation is not only empowered, but commanded, to perform the great guaranty. Power and duty here concur. Mr. Webster was right, when he called this provision “a very stringent article, drawing after it the most important consequences, and all of them good consequences.”[58]
The question, then, returns, What is “a republican form of government,” according to the requirement of the National Constitution? Mark, if you please, that it is not the meaning of this term according to Plato and Cicero, not even according to examples of history, nor according to definitions of monarchical writers or lexicographers,—but what is “a republican form of government” according to the requirements of the National Constitution? Of course these important words were not introduced and unanimously adopted without purpose. They must be interpreted so as to have real meaning. Any interpretation rendering them insignificant must be discarded as irrational and valueless, if not dishonest. They cannot be treated as a phrase only, nor a dead letter, nor an empty figure-head. Nor can they be treated as profession and nothing more, so that the Constitution shall merely seem to be republican, reversing the old injunction, “To be rather than to seem,”—Esse quam videri. They must be treated as real. Thus interpreted, they become at once a support of Human Rights and a balance-wheel to our whole political system.
In determining their signification, I begin by putting aside what is vague, unsatisfactory, and inapplicable, in order to bring the inquiry directly to American institutions.
I put aside all illustration derived from the speculations of ancient philosophers, because, on careful examination, it appears that the term “Republic,” as used by them, was so absolutely different from any idea among us as to exclude their definition from the debate. This captivating term is of Roman origin. It is the same as “commonwealth,” and means the public interest. As originally employed, it was not a specific term, describing a particular form of government, but a general term, embracing all governments, whether kingly, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. Its equivalent in Greece was “polity,” being the general term for all governments. Therefore the definition of a Republic, according to these ancients, is simply the definition of an organized government, whether kingly, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. Following this definition, the words of the Constitution are only the guaranty of an organized government, without determining its character. This, of course, leaves open the very question under consideration.
While the ancient nomenclature cannot be cited in determining the definition of a Republic, we may be encouraged by it in demanding that all government, whatever name it bears, shall be designed to establish justice and secure the general welfare. Thus, Plato, who commenced these interesting speculations, likens government to a just man, delighting in justice always, however treated by others; and the philosopher insists that every man is a government to himself as every[Pg 145] community is a government to itself. His ideal commonwealth appears in a good man, and this analogy testifies to the government he conceived. Aristotle, in a different vein, and with more precision, opens by declaring that “every state is a certain community” or “partnership.”[59] This idea appears again when he says, “Nothing more characterizes a complete citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government.”[60] In various places he speaks of “the common good” as a special object,—as, “when the One, the Few, or the Many govern for the common good, theirs must be called a good government”[61]; and he defines a democracy as “where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, are masters of the government.”[62] The same ideas find new fervor and expansion, when Cicero says, “A republic is the interest of the people. But by the people I do not mean every assemblage of men, gathered together anyhow, but a body of men associated through agreement in right and community of interest.”[63] And then again, in another place, the Roman philosopher says, “Only in a state where the power of the people is supreme has Liberty any abode, and, where not equal, it is not really Liberty.”[64] But all these requirements or aspirations are applicable to any government, of whatever form; and it is well known that Cicero recorded his preference for a government tempered by admixture of the three different kinds; so that we are not advanced in our definition, unless we insist that our Republic should have all the virtues accorded to the ideal commonwealth.[Pg 146] And yet there are two principles which all these philosophers teach: the first is justice; and the second is the duty of seeking the general welfare.
I next put aside the examples of history, as absolutely fallacious and inapplicable. In all ages, governments have been called Republics. Tacitus speaks of Rome under the tyranny of the Empire as the Republic; and Marcus Aurelius, while Emperor, pledges himself to the Republic. Indeed, there is hardly a government, from that of the great hunter Nimrod down to insulted and partitioned Poland, which has not been called Republic. In 1773, only a few years before the adoption of the National Constitution, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, after dividing Poland, undertook to establish fundamental laws for this conquered country, where was this declaration:—
“The government of Poland shall be forever free, independent, and of a republican form: the true principle of said government consisting in the strict execution of its laws, and the equilibrium of the three estates, namely, the king, the senate, and the equestrian order.”[65]
But a government thus composed cannot be recognized in this debate as “of a republican form.”
At the adoption of the Constitution, the most competent persons, who disagreed on other things, agreed in discarding these examples. Alexander Hamilton and John Adams met here on common ground. The former, in the Brief of his Argument, exhibits the various forms of government to which the term “Republic” has been applied.
“A Republic, a word used in various senses. Has been applied to aristocracies and monarchies. (1.) To Rome under the Kings. (2.) To Sparta, though a Senate for life. (3.) To Carthage, though the same. (4.) To United Netherlands, though Stadtholder, hereditary nobles. (5.) To Poland, though aristocracy and monarchy. (6.) To Great Britain, though monarchy, &c.”[66]
John Adams, in his Defence of the American Constitutions, written immediately anterior to the National Constitution, concurs with Hamilton.
“But, of all the words in all languages, perhaps there has been none so much abused in this way as the words Republic, Commonwealth, and Popular State. In the Rerum-Publicarum Collectio, of which there are fifty and odd volumes, and many of them very incorrect, France, Spain, and Portugal, the four great Empires, the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman, and even the Ottoman, are all denominated Republics.”[67]
In his old age the patriarch expressed himself in the same sense, and with equal force.
“The customary meanings of the words Republic and Commonwealth have been infinite. They have been applied to every government under heaven: that of Turkey, and that of Spain, as well as that of Athens and of Rome, of Geneva and San Marino.”[68]
And then again he said:—
“In some writing or other of mine, I happened, currente calamo, to drop the phrase, ‘The word Republic, as it is used, may signify anything, everything, or nothing.’ For this[Pg 148] escape I have been pelted, for twenty or thirty years, with as many stones as ever were thrown at St. Stephen, when St. Paul held the clothes of the stoners. But the aphorism is literal, strict, solemn truth. To speak technically, or scientifically, if you will, there are monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical republics. The government of Great Britain and that of Poland are as strictly republics as that of Rhode Island or Connecticut under their old charters.”[69]
In the latter remark, Mr. Adams simply repeats his treatise, where he calls England and Poland “monarchical or regal republics.”[70]
It is plain that our fathers, when they adopted the “guaranty” of “a republican form of government,” intended something certain, or which, if not certain on the face, could be made certain. But this excludes the authority of incongruous and inconsistent examples. They did not use words to signify “anything, everything, or nothing”; nor did they use words which were as applicable to England and Poland as to the United States. Therefore I cannot err in putting aside examples which, however they illustrate republican government in times past, are utterly out of place as a guide to the interpretation of the National Constitution. Something better must be found: nor is it wanting.
I put aside, also, definitions of European writers and lexicographers anterior to the National Constitution; for all these have the vagueness and uncertainty of political truth at that time in Europe. Among these, none is of higher authority than Montesquieu, who brought to political science study, genius, and a liberal spirit. But even this great writer, who profited by all his[Pg 149] predecessors, quickens and elevates without furnishing a satisfactory guide. He taught that “Virtue” was the inspiring principle of a republic, and by “virtue” he means the love of country, which, he says, is the love of equality.[71] This is beautiful, and makes Equality a foremost principle; but, with curious inconsistency, he includes “democracy” and “aristocracy” under the term “Republic,”—the former being where the people in mass have the sovereign power, and the latter “where the sovereign power is in the hands of part of the people.” When defining “democracy,” he expresses the importance of the suffrage as a fundamental of government, saying, among other things, that it is as important to regulate by whom the suffrage shall be given as in a monarchy to know who is the monarch.[72] But among all these glimpses of truth there is no definition of “a republican form of government” which can help us in interpreting the National Constitution. Surely an aristocracy, “where the sovereign power is in the hands of part of the people,” cannot find a just place in our political system. It may be “a republican form of government” according to Montesquieu, but it cannot be according to American institutions.
One of the ablest among the modern predecessors of Montesquieu was John Bodin, also a Frenchman, who wrote nearly two centuries earlier. Like the ancient writers, he uses the term “republic” to embrace monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which he calls “three kinds of republics,”—tria rerumpublicarum genera. If the republic is in the power of one, penes unum, it is a monarchy; if in the power of a few, penes paucos, it[Pg 150] is an aristocracy; if in the power of all, penes universos, it is a democracy. Proceeding further, he says that a democracy is “where all or the major part of all the citizens, omnes aut major pars omnium civium, collected together, have the supreme power.”[73] Here the philosopher plainly follows the rule of jurisprudence in regard to corporations; but this definition seems to sanction the exclusion of part of the citizens, less than a majority, while it is inadequate in other respects. It says nothing of equality of rights, or of that great touchstone of the republican idea, the dependence of taxation upon representation.
But in his day the word was general, and not specific, as appears in other instances. The easy-going and very natural Brantôme, a contemporary of Bodin, quotes a book of his day which in its title speaks of “the Republic of France.”[74] This was while the most unrepublican house of Valois ruled. The great Chancellor l’Hospital uses the word in the same sense, when in his famous testament he speaks of yielding to “the necessity of the Republic.”[75] We have also the authority of Henri Martin, in his admirable History of France, who says that the word in Bodin “means only the State in its broad signification.”[76] Plainly, from writers of this period there is little help in the present inquiry.
There are later definitions to be put aside also. Thus, for instance, it is often said that a republic is “a government[Pg 151] of laws, and not of men”; and this saying found favor with some among our fathers.[77] Long before, Aristotle had declared that such a government would be the kingdom of God.[78] But this condition, though marking an advanced degree of civilization, and of course essential to a republic, cannot be recognized as decisive. On its face it is vague from comprehensiveness. It is enough to say that it would embrace England, whose government our fathers renounced in order to build a republic. And still further, it would throw its shield over a government which “frameth mischief by a law.” This will not do.
There is also a plausible definition by Millar, the learned author of the work on the British Constitution, who states, hypothetically, that by Republic may be meant “a government in which there is no king or hereditary chief magistrate.”[79] But this, again, must be rejected, as leaving aristocracies and oligarchies in the category of republics.
Sometimes we hear that a government with an elective chief magistrate is a republic. Here, again, nothing is said of aristocracy or oligarchy, which coexist with an elective chief magistrate,—as in Venice, where the elected Doge was surrounded by an oligarchy of nobles, and in Holland, where the elected Stadtholder was a prince surrounded by princes. But there are other instances which make this definition unsatisfactory, if not absurd. The Pope of Rome is an elective chief magistrate; so also is the Grand Lama; but surely the States of the Church are not republican, nor is Thibet.
Rejecting the definition founded on the elective character of the chief magistrate, we must also reject another, founded on “the sovereignty of more than one man.” It has been said positively, by an eminent person who has written much on the subject, that “the strict definition of a republic is that in which the sovereignty resides in more than one man.”[80] But this strict definition embraces aristocracies and oligarchies.
I conclude these rejected specimens with that of Dr. Johnson in his Dictionary, which appeared before American Independence:—
“Republic. (1.) Commonwealth; state in which the power is lodged in more than one. (2.) Common interest; the public.”
These definitions are all as little to the purpose as the “vulgar error,” chronicled by Sir Thomas Browne, “that storks are to be found and will only live in republics,”[81]—or the saying of Rousseau, at a later day, that, “were there a nation of gods, it would govern itself democratically,”[82]—or the remark of John Adams, that “all good government is republican.”[83] It is evident that we must turn elsewhere for the illumination we need. If others thus far have failed, it is because they have looked across the sea instead of at home, and have searched foreign history and example instead of simply recognizing the history and example of their own country. They have imported inapplicable and uncertain definitions, forgetting that the Fathers, by positive[Pg 153] conduct, by solemn utterances, by declared opinions, and by public acts, all in harmony and constituting one overwhelming testimony, exhibited their idea of a republican government in a way at once applicable and certain. They are the natural interpreters of their own Constitution. Mr. Fox, the eminent English statesman, exclaimed in debate, that, “if, by a peculiar interposition of Divine power, all the wisest men of every age and of every country could be collected into one assembly, he did not believe that their united wisdom would be capable of forming even a tolerable constitution,”[84]—meaning, of course, that a constitution must be derived from habits and convictions, and not from any invention. There is sound sense in the remark; and it is in this spirit that I turn from a discussion having only this value, that it shows how little there is in the past to interpret the meaning of the Fathers.
Every constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err in turning to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence they have left on the question. By “a republican form of government” our fathers plainly intended a government representing the principles for which they had struggled. Now, if it appears that through years of controversy they insisted on certain principles as vital to free government, even to the extent of encountering the mother country in war,—that afterward, on solemn occasions, they heralded these principles to the world as “self-evident truths,”—that[Pg 154] also, in declared opinions, they sustained these principles,—and that in public acts they embodied these principles,—then is it beyond dispute that these principles must have entered into the idea of the government they took pains to place under the guaranty of the nation. But all these things can be shown unanswerably.
In these words of hypothesis I foreshadow the four different heads under which these principles may be seen.
First, as asserted by the Fathers throughout the long radical controversy which culminated in war.
Secondly, as announced in solemn declarations.
Thirdly, as sustained in declared opinions.
Fourthly, as embodied in public acts.
1. I begin with the principles asserted by our fathers throughout the protracted controversy that preceded the Revolution. If Senators ask why our fathers struggled so long in controversy with the mother country, and then went forth to battle, they will find that it was to establish the very principles for which I now contend. To secure the natural rights of men, and especially to vindicate the controlling maxim that there can be no taxation without representation, they fought with argument and then with arms. Had these been conceded, there would have been no Lexington or Bunker Hill, and the Colonies would have continued yet longer under transatlantic rule. The first object was not independence, but the establishment of these principles; and when at last independence began, it was because these principles could be secured in no other way. Therefore the triumph of independence was the triumph of these principles, which necessarily entered[Pg 155] into and became the animating soul of the Republic then and there born. The evidence is complete, and, if I dwell on it with minuteness, it is because of its decisive character.
The great controversy opened with the pretension of Parliament to tax the Colonies, first disclosed to Benjamin Franklin as early as 1754. It was at the time a profound secret; but the patriot philosopher, whose rare intelligence embraced the natural laws of government not less than those of science, in a few masterly sentences exposed the injustice of taxation without representation.[85] For a moment the Ministry shrank back; but at last, when the power of France had been humbled, and the Colonies were no longer needed as allies in war, George Grenville, blind to principle and only seeing an increase of revenue, renewed the irrational claim. The Colonies were to be taxed by the Parliament in which they had no representation. Two millions and a half of people—for such was the population then—were to pay taxes without voice in determining them. The men of that day listened to the tidings with dismay. In this ministerial outrage they saw the overthrow of their liberties, whether founded on natural rights or on the rights of British subjects. In their conclusions they were confirmed by two names of authority in British history, Algernon Sidney and John Locke, each of whom solemnly asserted the liberties now in danger. One had borne his testimony on the scaffold, the other in exile.
Sidney, in his Discourses on Government, did not hesitate to say, that “God leaves to man the choice[Pg 156] of forms in government,”—and then again, that “all just magistratical power is from the people.”[86] Such words were calculated to strengthen the sentiment of human freedom. But it was Locke who gave formal expression to the very principles now assailed. In a famous passage of his work on Civil Government, inspired and tempered by his exile in Holland, this eminent Englishman bore his testimony.
“It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i. e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them; for, if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government; for what property have I in that which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?”[87]
Here is a plain enunciation of two capital truths: first, that all political society stands only on the consent of the governed; and, secondly, that taxation without representation is an invasion of fundamental right. It was these truths that our fathers embraced in the controversy before them; and these same truths, happily characterized by Hallam as “fertile of great revolutions and perhaps pregnant with more,”[88] are as fertile and as pregnant now as then.
But even this illumination did not begin with these illustrious Englishmen. Two centuries before their testimony, Philippe de Comines, a minister of Louis the Eleventh, in his Memoirs, marking an epoch in historical literature, announced the same principle; so that here France antedates England.
“Is there king or lord on earth who has power, outside his domain [personal estate], to impose a penny upon his subjects, without grant and consent of those who must pay it, unless by tyranny or violence?”[89]
That good man, who excelled so much as teacher, and did so much for scholarship and history, Arnold of Rugby, records a conclusion hardly less important than that of his earlier compatriots.
“It seems to be assumed in modern times that the being born of free parents within the territory of any particular state, and the paying towards the support of its government, conveys a natural claim to the rights of citizenship.”[90]
Others had said there could be taxation only with the consent of the people taxed. The last authority exhibits citizenship associated with contribution to the support of the government. This same political truth appeared in Virginia as early as 1655-6, where, by solemn enactment, repealing a restriction upon suffrage, it was declared “something hard and unagreeable to reason that any persons shall pay equal taxes and yet have no votes in elections.”[91] And it reappears in the famous Declaration of Rights, adopted unanimously June 12, 1776, which announces that men[Pg 158] “cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected.”[92]
Sidney and Locke unquestionably exercised more influence over the popular mind, preceding the Revolution, than any other writers. They were constantly quoted, and their names were held in reverence. But their authority has not ceased. As they spoke to our fathers, they now speak to us: Sicut patribus, sic nobis.
The cause of Human Liberty, in this great controversy, found voice in James Otis, a young lawyer of eloquence, learning, and courage, whose early words, like the notes of the morning bugle mingling with the dawn, awakened the whole country. Asked by the merchants of Boston to speak at the bar against Writs of Assistance, issued to enforce ancient Acts of Parliament, he spoke both as lawyer and as patriot, and so doing became a statesman. His speech was the most important, down to that occasion, ever made on this side of the ocean. An earnest contemporary, who was present, says, “No harangue of Demosthenes or Cicero ever had such effects upon this globe as that speech.”[93] It was the harbinger of a new era. For five hours the brilliant orator unfolded the character of these Acts of Parliament; for five hours he held the court-room in rapt and astonished admiration; but his effort ascended into statesmanship, when, after showing that the colonists were without representation in Parliament, he cried out, that, notwithstanding this exclusion, Parliament had undertaken to “impose taxes, and enormous taxes, burdensome taxes, oppressive, ruinous, intolerable taxes”;[Pg 159] and then, glowing with generous indignation at this injustice, he launched that thunderbolt of political truth, “Taxation without representation is Tyranny.”[94] From the narrow court-room where he spoke, the thunderbolt passed, smiting and blasting the intolerable pretension. It was the idea of John Locke; but the fervid orator, with tongue of flame, gave to it the intensity of his own genius. He found it in a book of philosophy; but he sent it forth a winged messenger blazing in the sky.
John Adams, then a young man just admitted to the bar, was present at the scene, and he dwells on it often with sympathetic delight. There, in the Old Town-House of Boston, sat the five judges of the Province, with Hutchinson as Chief Justice, in robes of scarlet, cambric bands, and judicial wigs; and there, too, in gowns, bands, and tie-wigs, were the barristers. Conspicuous on the wall were full-length portraits of two British monarchs, Charles the Second and James the Second, while in the corners were the likenesses of Massachusetts Governors. In this presence the great oration was delivered. The patriot lawyer had refused compensation. “In such a cause as this,” said he, “I despise a fee.” He spoke for country and for mankind. Firmly he planted himself on the Rights of Man, which he insisted were, by the everlasting Law of Nature, inherent and inalienable; and these rights, he nobly proclaimed, were common to all, without distinction of color. To suppose them surrendered in any other way than by equal rules and general consent was to suppose men idiot or mad, whose acts are not binding. But he especially flew at two arguments of tyranny: first,[Pg 160] that the colonists were “virtually” represented, and, secondly, that there was such a difference between direct and indirect taxation, that, while the former might be questionable, the latter was not. To these two apologies he replied, first, that no such phrase as “virtual representation” was known in Law or Constitution,—that it is altogether subtilty and illusion, wholly unfounded and absurd,—and that we must not be cheated by any such phantom, or other fiction of law or politics, or any monkish trick of deceit and hypocrisy; and then, with the same crushing force, he said, that, in absence of representation, all taxation, whether direct or indirect, whether internal or external, whether on land or trade, was equally obnoxious to the same unhesitating condemnation.[95] The effect was electric. The judges were stunned into silence, and postponed judgment. The people were aroused to a frenzy of patriotism. “American Independence,” says John Adams, in the record of his impressions, “was then and there born; the seeds of patriots and heroes were then and there sown, to defend the vigorous youth. Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.”[96] But this great birth is inseparably associated with the principle, then and there declared, that “Taxation without representation is Tyranny.”
From this time forward Otis dedicated himself singly[Pg 161] to the cause he had so bravely upheld, and the popular heart clove to him. He became the favorite of his fellow-countrymen. His arguments were repeated, his words were gratefully adopted, and the saying, “Taxation without representation is tyranny,” became a maxim of patriotism. In May, 1761, only a few weeks after this utterance, he was chosen a representative of Boston in the Legislature by an almost unanimous vote. The Crown officers were dismayed by this most significant election, and one of them, speaking with prophetic lamentation, said it would “shake the Province to its foundation”; on which John Adams remarked, many years later, when some of its results were already visible, “That election has shaken two continents, and will shake four.”[97] Of course this was simply because it affirmed and invigorated a practical truth of government by which all the people are confirmed in political power. At his new post of duty, Otis became the acknowledged leader, constant, fervid, eloquent, and, according to his own language, “daring to speak plain English.” While still declaring unhesitating loyalty to the Crown, and even pledging “the last penny and the last drop of blood, rather than that by any backwardness of ours his Majesty’s measures should be embarrassed,” he made haste to announce, in words where humor blends with truth, that “God made all men naturally equal,”—that “the ideas of earthly superiority, preëminence, and grandeur are educational, at least acquired, not innate,”—that “no government has a right to make hobby-horses, asses, and slaves of the subject, Nature having made sufficient of the two former for all the lawful purposes of man, from the harmless[Pg 162] peasant in the field to the most refined politician in the cabinet, but none of the last, which infallibly proves they are unnecessary.” But the case would have been imperfectly stated, if the patriot representative had not once more cried out against taxation without representation, and warned against the calamities that must follow from this unquestionable tyranny. This early debate is preserved in a pamphlet, printed in 1762, and entitled “A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, etc., by James Otis, Esq.,” which, we are told by an eminent authority, contains, in solid substance, all that is found in the Declaration of Rights and Wrongs issued by Congress in 1774, the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the subsequent writings of those political philosophers who upheld the national cause.[98] Pardon me, if I dwell too minutely on this history. I do it only to illustrate the issue of principle actually made with the mother country.
The controversy still continued, when, in 1764, the orator, who by voice and pen had so bravely maintained the cause of his country, put forth another publication, entitled “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved.” Mark, if you please, the vigor of the title. The rights of the Colonies are not only “asserted,” but “proved.” Reprinted in London, this pamphlet was read by Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of England, and was answered by Soame Jenyns, a partisan writer of the Crown. The copy I hold in my hand has the imprint of London, and is marked “Third Edition.” All things considered, it is the most remarkable[Pg 163] pamphlet of our country, and one of the most remarkable ever written. Recent events, verifying the truths it so early announced, elevate its place in history. Here are the same vital principles, enforced with learning and eloquence, which Otis announced at the bar, and then again in the debates of the Legislature; and here are not only the truths asserted by our fathers, but the unanswerable arguments by which they were vindicated. Even an abstract would be too long for this debate; but the character of this Defence of the American People, not unlike Milton’s famous “Defensio pro Populo Anglicano,” will appear in a few passages, where, as in gleams, may be discerned the Idea of a Republic.
I do not pause on the assertion, “that every man of a sound mind should have his vote,” or the authority he invokes, when he says, “Lord Coke declares that it is against Magna Charta and against the franchises of the land, for freemen to be taxed but by their own consent,” both of which, sounded by him elsewhere,[99] are important premises. Nor do I dwell on that admirable statement of much in little, “The first simple principle is Equality and the Power of the Whole.”[100] The Equality of All and the Power of All!—the two buttresses of a just government. I come at once to the plain statement of fundamental right.
“The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his consent in person or by representation.”
“Taxes are not to be laid on the people but by their consent in person or by deputation.”[101]
Such are “the first principles of law and justice, and the great barriers of a free state”; and then he adds, “I ask, I want no more.”[102] And these principles he claims for all, without distinction of color.
“The colonists are by the Law of Nature free-born, as indeed all men are, white or black.… Does it follow that ‘tis right to enslave a man because he is black? Will short, curled hair, like wool, instead of Christian hair, as ’tis called by those whose hearts are as hard as the nether millstone, help the argument? Can any logical inference in favor of Slavery be drawn from a flat nose, a long or a short face?”[103]
Assuming these rights as common to all, whether white or black, he insists that any taxation, whether direct or indirect, without representation, is only another form of Slavery.
“I can see no reason to doubt but that the imposition of taxes, whether on trade, or on land, or houses, or ships, on real or personal, fixed or floating property, in the Colonies, is absolutely irreconcilable with the rights of the colonists, as British subjects, and as men. I say men, for in a state of Nature no man can take my property from me without my consent. If he does, he deprives me of my liberty and makes me a slave.… The very act of taxing, exercised over those who are not represented, appears to me to be depriving them of one of their most essential rights as freemen, and, if continued, seems to be in effect an entire disfranchisement of every civil right. For what one civil right is worth a rush, after a man’s property is subject to be taken from him at pleasure, without his consent?”[104]
Such was the voice of James Otis, who was our John the Baptist. It was he who went before in this great[Pg 165] controversy. He first stated the case between the Colonies and the mother country, and first developed the principles in issue. But, though first, he was not long alone. Conspicuous among his followers was Samuel Adams, that austere patriot, always faithful and true, who desired to make Puritan Boston “a Christian Sparta.” He was remarkable for the simplicity, accuracy, and harmony of his style, and on this account often held the pen for the Legislature or the town-meeting. In obedience to the latter, he drew up instructions to the Representatives of Boston, afterward adopted in Faneuil Hall, where, repeating the very arguments of Otis, he says, “If our trade may be taxed, why not our lands, why not the produce of our lands, and everything we possess or make use of?” And then, advancing in the subject, he asks: “If taxes are laid upon us in any shape without our having a legal representation where they are laid, are we not reduced from the character of free subjects to the miserable state of tributary slaves?”[105] In proposing this question, he leaves no room to doubt the answer it deserved.
Soon thereafter, Franklin, as agent of Pennsylvania, maintained the same principles in England. But the ministry, hurried on by fatal folly leading to destruction, persevered in their pretension. The Stamp Act was passed, and for the first time in our history papers bore stamps, to swell the revenue of the Crown. Massachusetts remonstrated in formal resolutions, “particularly considered,” wherein it is declared, “That there are certain essential rights of the British Constitution of Government, which are founded in the law of God[Pg 166] and Nature, and are the common rights of mankind,—therefore, … that no man can justly take the property of another without his consent,— … that all acts made by any power whatever, other than the General Assembly of this Province, imposing taxes on the inhabitants, are infringements of our inherent and unalienable rights as men and British subjects, and render void the most valuable declarations of our Charter.”[106] In an address to the Royal Governor, the Legislature, after setting forth the injustice of the Stamp Act, proceeded to say, “We must beg your Excellency to excuse us from doing anything to assist in the execution of it.”[107] The people in town-meetings took up the strain, and all united against the Act. But Massachusetts was not alone.
Virginia, by positive statute, as early as 1655-6 recognized the just principle, as we have already seen;[108] and now a writer of that State, catching the spirit of Otis, declared, in an elaborate pamphlet, that it was “an essential principle of the English Constitution that the subject shall not be taxed without his consent”; and then again, quoting the words of another, “All men have natural, and freemen legal rights, which they may justly maintain, and no legislative authority can deprive them of.”[109] The Legislature of Virginia, even before Massachusetts, adopted resolutions kindred in spirit, which were moved by Patrick Henry, and heroically[Pg 167] carried by his eloquent voice, even against the menacing cry of “Treason.” Thus spoke Virginia, exposing the true issue, and insisting on the inseparability of taxation and representation:—
“Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to bear, or the easiest method of raising them, and must themselves be affected by every tax laid on the people, is the only security against a burdensome taxation and the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, without which the ancient Constitution cannot exist.”[110]
Pennsylvania, by her House of Assembly, spoke also to the same effect:—
“Resolved, N. C. D., That this House think it their duty thus firmly to assert with modesty and decency their inherent rights, that their posterity may learn and know that it was not with their consent and acquiescence that any taxes should be levied on them by any persons but their own representatives.”[111]
The controversy proceeded. At the invitation of Massachusetts, moved by Otis, a Congress assembled at New York in October, 1765, having delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, which, after a prolonged session, adopted a declaration of colonial rights and grievances, where it is declared:—
“That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes[Pg 168] be imposed on them but with their own consent, given personally or by their representatives.
“That the people of these Colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the House of Commons in Great Britain.”[112]
At last the Stamp Act was repealed. But the pretension of taxation was suspended rather than abandoned. A ministerial partisan continued to urge the scheme in unscrupulous language:—
“All countries unaccustomed to taxes are at first violently prepossessed against them, though the price which they give for their liberty: like an ox untamed to the yoke, they show at first a very stubborn neck, but by degrees become docile and yield a willing obedience.… America must be taxed.”[113]
As time advanced, the old audacity was revived, and, under the lead of the reckless Charles Townshend, taxes were imposed by Parliament on tea, glass, lead, paper, and painters’ colors. The old opposition in the Colonies was revived also, and taxation without representation was again denounced. Committees of correspondence were established, and the work of organization began. The whole country was in a fever. Massachusetts, as in times past, did not hesitate to proclaim the true principle. At a town-meeting of Boston in 1772, there was a declaration of rights, “which no man or body of men, consistently with their own rights as men and citizens or members of society, can for themselves give up or take away from others”; and here we meet again familiar words:—
“The supreme power cannot justly take from any man any part of his property without his consent in person or by his representatives.”[114]
Against all Parliamentary taxation, as often as it showed itself, this impenetrable buckler was lifted. But the mother country was perverse. Ship-loads of tea arrived. At Boston the tea was thrown into the dock. The Colonies entered into an agreement of non-importation. Then came troops, and the Boston Port Bill, by which this harbor was vindictively closed against commerce. The whole country, including even South Carolina, made common cause with Massachusetts. Gadsden exclaimed, “Massachusetts sounded the trumpet, but to Carolina is it owing that it was attended to.”[115] And Virginia exclaimed, “We will never be taxed but by our own representatives. This is the great badge of Freedom.… Whether the people in Boston were warranted by justice, when they destroyed the tea, we know not; but this we know, that the Parliament, by their proceedings, have made us and all North America parties in the present dispute.”[116] Meanwhile more troops arrived. All things portended strife; and yet the colonists did not ask for independence. They only asked for rights, insisting always that there should be no taxation without representation. “The patriots of this Province,” said John Adams in 1774, “desire nothing new; they wish only to keep their old privileges. They were for one hundred and fifty years allowed to tax themselves, and[Pg 170] govern their internal concerns as they thought best. Parliament governed their trade as they thought fit. This plan they wish may continue forever.”[117] Thus stood the two parties face to face.
Then came the Continental Congress, which at once put forth resolutions, where, after claiming the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, as natural rights, it was insisted that the colonists could be bound by no law to which they had not consented by representatives. Here was the original programme of James Otis: first, the rights of men, according to Natural Law; and, secondly, the principle that government, including of course taxation, depended on the consent of the governed. “The foundation of English Liberty and of all free government,” said these resolutions, “is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council.”[118] In harmony with these resolutions were the several addresses of the Continental Congress,—to the people of Great Britain, to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, and to the king himself,—always pleading for Human Rights in the largest sense. The address to the people of Great Britain begins by an appeal for “the rights of men and the blessings of Liberty,” and then insists “that no power on earth has a right to take our property from us without our consent.”[119] The address to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, in similar spirit, says: “The first grand right is that of the people having a share in their own government by their representatives chosen by themselves, and, in consequence, of being ruled by laws which they themselves approve, not by edicts of men over whom they have no control.[Pg 171] This is a bulwark surrounding and defending their property.”[120] And the petition to the king has the same key-note: “Duty to your Majesty, and regard for the preservation of ourselves and our posterity, the primary obligations of Nature and society, command us to entreat your royal attention.”[121] Thus constantly, down to the last moment, did our fathers set forth the principles they sought to establish as essential to free government. Thus constantly did they testify to the cause for which I now plead.
Answering voices came back from England, announcing the principles in issue. The right of taxation was asserted; but there were many who disguised the tyranny by assuming that the Colonies were “virtually represented.” Perhaps that spirit of legal technicality which is satisfied by form at the expense of reason was never more strikingly illustrated than in the argument of Sir James Marriott, the Admiralty Judge, who gravely insisted, in the House of Commons, that England “had an undoubted right to tax America, because she was represented by the members for the County of Kent, of which the thirteen provinces were a part or parcel, for in their charters they were to hold of the manor of Greenwich in Kent.”[122] The whole pretension had been scouted by the indignant eloquence of Mr. Pitt, afterward Lord Chatham. “The idea,” said he, “of a virtual representation of America in this House is the most contemptible idea that ever entered into the head of a man. It does not deserve a serious refutation.[Pg 172]”[123] As the controversy continued, and especially as those masterly state papers, the addresses of the Continental Congress, reached England, the ministers of the king were put on the defensive. They retained as advocate none other than Samuel Johnson, who, for “small hire,” lent the pen which had written “Rasselas,” “The Vanity of Human Wishes,” and the English Dictionary, to a rancorous attack on the principles of our fathers. Its concentrated venom was all expressed in the title, “Taxation no Tyranny.” Another pamphlet appeared in reply, with the epigram, “Resistance no Rebellion,” embodying the idea, that, where there is taxation without representation, resistance is justifiable; and thus was issue joined at London. This was in 1775. Already the “embattled farmers” had gathered at Lexington and Bunker Hill; already Washington had drawn his sword at Cambridge, as commander-in-chief and generalissimo of the new-born armies; already war had begun. At last, to the defiant watchword, “Taxation no Tyranny,” hurled from London, our fathers returned that other defiant watchword, “Independence.” But they did not turn their backs upon the principles asserted throughout the long controversy. Independence was the means to an end, and that end was nothing less than a Republic, with Liberty and Equality as animating principles, where government stood on the consent of the governed, or, which is the same thing, where there should be no taxation without representation: for here was the distinctive feature of American institutions.
2. The principles heralded through fifteen years of controversy were not forgotten when Independence was[Pg 173] declared: and here I come to the national declarations of the Fathers.
It sometimes happens that men fail in support of the cause to which they are pledged, or content themselves with something less than the truth. But not so with our fathers. In declaring Independence they continued loyal to their constant vows. The natural rights of all men, and the consent of the people as the only just foundation of government, which James Otis first announced, which Samuel Adams maintained with severe simplicity, which Patrick Henry vindicated even against the cry of “Treason,” and which had been affirmed by legislative bodies and public meetings, were embodied in the opening words of the Declaration. There they stand, like a sublime overture to the new Republic, interpreting, inspiring, and filling it with transforming power.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”
Nor did these declarations proceed from the National Congress alone. The States spoke also in their Bills of Rights.
Foremost is the Equality of All Men. Of course, in a declaration of rights, no such supreme folly was intended as that all men are created equal in form or capacity, bodily or mental,—but simply that they are created equal in rights. This is grandest of the self-evident truths announced, leading and governing all the rest. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are[Pg 174] among inalienable rights; but they are all in subordination to that primal truth. Here is the starting-point of the whole; and the end is like the starting-point. Announcing that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, the Declaration repeats the same proclamation of Equal Rights. Thus is Equality the Alpha and the Omega, wherein all other rights are embraced. Men may not have a natural right to certain things, but most clearly they have a natural right to impartial laws, without which justice, being the end and aim of government, must fail. Equality in rights is the first of rights. Because these self-evident truths, beginning with Equality, had been set at nought by Great Britain, in her relations with our fathers, Independence was declared. To these truths, therefore, was the new Government solemnly dedicated, as it assumed its separate and equal station among the powers of the earth. Do you ask for the definition of Republic? Here it is, by patriot lexicographers, whose authority none of us can question.
As the War of Independence began with a declaration of principles, so it ended with a like declaration. At its successful close, the Continental Congress, in an Address to the States, by the pen of James Madison, thus announced the objects for which it had been waged, and thus supplied another definition of the new government:—
“Let it be remembered that it has ever been the pride and boast of America, that the rights for which she contended were the rights of human nature. By the blessing of the Author of these rights on the means exerted for their defence, they have prevailed against all opposition, and form the basis of thirteen independent States. No instance has[Pg 175] heretofore occurred, nor can any instance be expected hereafter to occur, in which the unadulterated forms of Republican Government can pretend to so fair an opportunity of justifying themselves by their fruits. In this view, the citizens of the United States are responsible for the greatest trust ever confided to a political society.”[124]
Such, also, was the sublime sentiment promulgated by Washington from his camp, in a general order, near the same date, announcing the close of the war, where he declares his “rapture” in the national prospects, and the three-fold happiness for all “who have assisted in protecting the rights of human nature.”[125] It was for “the rights of human nature” that our fathers went forth to battle, and these rights are proclaimed to “form the basis of thirteen independent States.” But supreme among these is Equality, including of course the equal right of all to a voice in the Government. And this is the Republic which our fathers, with pride and boast, then gave as an example to mankind.
The same spirit appears in the National Constitution, which, by its preamble, asserts practically similar sentiments:—
“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
Thus was the National Constitution ordained, not to create an oligarchy or aristocracy, not to exclude certain persons from the pale of its privileges, not to organize[Pg 176] inequality of rights in any form, but to “establish justice,” which is Equality,—to “insure domestic tranquillity,” which is vain without justice,—to “provide for the common defence,” which is the defence of all,—to “promote the general welfare,” which is the welfare of all,—and to “secure the blessings of liberty” to all the people and their posterity, which is giving to all the complete enjoyment of rights central among which is Equality. Here, then, is another authoritative definition.
Thus has our country testified to its idea of a Republic, not only throughout long days of controversy, but in national declarations, being in themselves monumental acts.
3. From these national declarations I come now to the Opinions of the Fathers. Here you see how these same principles have been sustained by eminent characters, whose names are historic, all testifying to the government they founded and upheld. In their weighty words you find a definition, constantly repeated, in harmony with all the promises of the Fathers, whether in controversy or in solemn instruments which are the very title-deeds of the Republic.
I begin with Benjamin Franklin, who saw all questions of Government with a surer instinct than any other person in our history. As early as 1736, while still a young man, he wrote an article, which was published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, containing these words:—
“Popular Governments have not been framed without the wisest reasons. It seemed highly fitting that the conduct of[Pg 177] magistrates, created by and for the good of the whole, should be made liable to the inspection and animadversion of the whole.”[126]
It is for the good of the whole, and not for an odious oligarchy or an aristocratic class, that our patriot speaks, and in these words is foreshadowed the idea of a republican government. But it was in discussions, after Otis had hurled his flaming bolt, that we find a fuller and more precise definition. Here it is, as adopted, if not written, by Franklin:—
“That every man of the commonalty (excepting infants, insane persons, and criminals) is, of common right, and by the laws of God, a freeman, and entitled to the free enjoyment of liberty.
“That liberty, or freedom, consists in having an actual share in the appointment of those who frame the laws, and who are to be the guardians of every man’s life, property, and peace: for the all of one man is as dear to him as the all of another; and the poor man has an equal right, but more need, to have representatives in the Legislature than the rich one.
“That they who have no voice nor vote in the electing of representatives do not enjoy liberty, but are absolutely enslaved to those who have votes, and to their representatives: for to be enslaved is to have governors whom other men have set over us, and be subject to laws made by the representatives of others, without having had representatives of our own to give consent in our behalf.”[127]
In these emphatic words is a complete vindication of the equal right of representation, as essential to free government,—so much so, that, where this does not exist, Liberty does not exist.
Jefferson followed Franklin in the same vein, but with greater fervor. The author of the Declaration of Independence could not do otherwise. Constantly he testifies to his idea of a Republic. Thus he wrote to Alexander von Humboldt, under date of June 13, 1817, affirming the rights of the majority as “the first principle of Republicanism,” and assuming the principle of Equal Rights:—
“The first principle of Republicanism is, that the lex majoris partis is the fundamental law of every society of individuals of equal rights. To consider the will of the society enounced by the majority of a single vote as sacred as if unanimous is the first of all lessons in importance, yet the last which is thoroughly learnt. This law once disregarded, no other remains but that of force, which ends necessarily in military despotism.”[128]
In another letter, to John Taylor, of Caroline, dated May 28, 1816, he thus defines a Republic:—
“Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the term Republic is of very vague application in every language. Witness the self-styled Republics of Holland, Switzerland, Genoa, Venice, Poland. Were I to assign to this term a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority,—and that every other government is more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizens.”[129]
Here again, while confessing the unquestionable vagueness of the term according to old examples, he assumes that in a republic all citizens must have a[Pg 179] voice. And again, in the same letter, he thus indignantly condemns denial of representation:—
“And also that one half of our brethren who fight and pay taxes are excluded, like Helots, from the rights of representation, as if society were instituted for the soil, and not for the men inhabiting it, or one half of these could dispose of the rights and the will of the other half without their consent.”[130]
Thus did he scout the whole wretched pretension of oligarchy and monopoly by which citizens are deprived of equal rights.
To these may be added his earliest and latest declarations on this important question. The earliest is in his “Notes on Virginia,” written in 1781, where he recognizes “a reciprocation of right” as a presiding principle:—
“When arguing for ourselves, we lay it down as a fundamental, that laws, to be just, must give a reciprocation of right: that without this they are mere arbitrary rules of conduct, founded in force, and not in conscience.”[131]
The latest declaration was in 1826, the year of his death. It is in a paper containing some of his most intimate opinions. Here he bears testimony to “equality among our citizens” as “essential to the maintenance of republican government.”[132] These are among his dying words.
Madison was colder in nature than Jefferson; but they were associates in opinion, as in political life. In the debates on the National Constitution the former condemned the denial of rights on account of color:—
“We have seen the mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.”[133]
Speaking directly of the right of suffrage, he uses the following language:—
“The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms.”[134]
Thus declaring himself against “aristocracies,” he naturally recognized the true idea; and here he was perplexed by the question of a property qualification, and the effort to reconcile it with “the right of suffrage,” which he calls “a fundamental article in republican constitutions.”[135] In another place, he says of “confining the right of suffrage to freeholders”: “It violates the vital principle of free government, that those who are to be bound by laws ought to have a voice in making them; and the violation would be more strikingly unjust as the lawmakers become the minority.”[136] Completely recognizing the great American principle, that just government can stand only on “the consent of the governed,” he is brought to this conclusion:—
“Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the mass of citizens should not be without a voice in making the laws which they are to obey, and in choosing the magistrates who are to administer them.”[137]
In one of the most remarkable chapters of the “Federalist,” Madison gives expansion to this idea in his formal definition of a Republic:—
“If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a Republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it: otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of Republic.”[138]
Thus, in few significant words, does this authority teach that a Republic is a government derived from “the great body of the people,” and not from “a favored class of it.” Better words could not be found for the American definition.
I repeat these two conditions of republican government according to Madison: First, the government must be derived from the great body of the people; and, secondly, it cannot spring from any favored class.
That the colored race should not be excluded from this definition may be justly inferred from his remark, already quoted, that “where Slavery exists the republican theory becomes still more fallacious,”[139] and also from his correspondence at a later day with Lafayette, whose devotion to the great principle of Equal[Pg 182] Rights was blazoned before the world. Writing to the latter, November 25, 1820, he said:—
“The Constitutions and laws of the different States are much at variance in the civic character given to free persons of color: those of most of the States, not excepting such as have abolished Slavery, imposing various disqualifications, which degrade them from the rank and rights of white persons. All these perplexities develop more and more the dreadful fruitfulness of the original sin of the African trade.”[140]
“Various disqualifications which degrade them”; “dreadful fruitfulness”: such are some of the terms in which judgment is recorded. Another letter, also to Lafayette, written as late as February 1, 1830, says:—
“Outlets for the freed blacks are alone wanted for a rapid erasure of the blot [of Slavery] from our Republican character.”[141]
Thus, in his opinion, was the treatment of this unhappy people inconsistent with the “Republican character.”
Hamilton follows with perhaps equal authority. Though approaching political questions from opposite points of view, we find him uniting with Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison. Here is a glimpse of the definition he would supply:—
“As long as offices are open to all men and no constitutional rank is established, it is pure republicanism.”[142]
Not for an oligarchy, but for all, is a Republic created. Then again he testifies for Equal Rights, and against partial distinctions:—
“There can be no truer principle than this, that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of Government.… We propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial distinctions are maintained?”[143]
Again he says, in positive words:—
“A share in the sovereignty of the State, which is exercised by the citizens at large in voting at elections, is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a Republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law. It is that right by which we exist a free people.”[144]
He then exhibits the crowning lesson:—
“The principles of the Revolution taught the inhabitants of this country to risk their lives and fortunes in asserting their liberty, or, in other words, their right to a share in the government. That portion of the sovereignty to which each individual is entitled can never be too highly prized. It is that for which we have fought and bled.”[145]
More could not be said in the few words. But it is when Hamilton comes to consider the National Constitution and to expound its provisions, that, while recognizing the anomalous condition of Slavery, and exposing what he calls “the compromising expedient of the Constitution” by which “the slave is divested of two fifths of the man,” he yet declares “the equal level of free inhabitants,” and announces, “that, if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.” Here is this important text,—which has additional authority when it is considered that it was attributed also to Madison,[Pg 184] and indeed claimed by him, who thus acknowledged the sentiments as his own:—
“It is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is denied to them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that, if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.”[146]
Thus, according to Hamilton, if the slaves are restored to the rights which have been taken away,—in other words, if they become freemen,—they will be on the same equal level, and entitled to the same equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. The two ideas of Equality and a Right to Representation, so early and constantly avowed by the Fathers, are here again recognized as essential conditions of government; and this is the true definition of a Republic.
With these great representative names to illustrate the American idea I might close the catalogue. Surely this is sufficient. But there are others, whose authority cannot be disregarded.
Here is the testimony of that inflexible spirit, who had thought and acted much, Samuel Adams, in a letter to his kinsman, John Adams:—
“That the sovereignty resides in the people is a political doctrine which I have never heard an American politician seriously deny.… We, the people, is the style of the[Pg 185] Federal Constitution. They adopted it; and, conformably to it, they delegate the exercise of the powers of government to particular persons, who, after short intervals, resign their powers to the people, and they will reëlect them, or appoint others, as they think fit.”[147]
Here also is the testimony of another Republican, who signed the Declaration of Independence, Roger Sherman, in a letter to John Adams:—
“What especially denominates it a Republic is its dependence on the public or people at large, without any hereditary powers. But it is not of so much importance by what appellation the government is distinguished as to have it well constituted to secure the rights and advance the happiness of the community.”[148]
There also was John Adams himself, who was the least distinct of all the Fathers on this question; but we find in the Preface to his Defence of the American Constitutions a passage full of prophetic meaning:—
“Thirteen governments, thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind.”[149]
Here is a plain assertion that our Thirteen States were founded “on the natural authority of the people alone,” and that they were destined to spread over all North America.
Charles Pinckney, in a speech on the adoption of the Constitution, speaks for South Carolina:—
“The doctrine of representation is the fundamental of a republic.… As to the United Netherlands, it is such a confusion of states and assemblies, that I have always been at loss what species of government to term it. According to my idea of the word, it is not a republic; for I conceive it as indispensable in a republic that all authority should flow from the people.… A republic is where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, form the Legislature.”[150]
Luther Martin, an able representative of Maryland in the Convention, while vindicating a prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves, said:—
“The privilege of importing them was unreasonable; and it was inconsistent with the principles of the Revolution, and dishonorable to the American character, to have such a feature in the Constitution.”[151]
Afterwards, in his address to the Legislature of Maryland, he announced that both in the Committee and in the Convention he was influenced by the argument,—
“that Slavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and has a tendency to destroy those principles on which it is supported, as it lessens the sense of the Equal Rights of mankind, and habituates us to tyranny and oppression.”[152]
Thus was a “sense of the Equal Rights of mankind” one of the principles on which Republicanism rested.
And here is one more word from Virginia: it is Colonel Mason, who always spoke with so much point:—
“The true idea, in his opinion, was, that every man, having evidence of attachment to and permanent common interest with the society, ought to share in all its rights and privileges.”[153]
Again we have a plain recognition of the Revolutionary idea.
Here, also, is another authority. I quote a Virginia writer on Government,—John Taylor, of Caroline:—
“The end of the guaranty is ‘a republican form of government.’ The meaning of this expression is not so unsettled here as in other countries, because we agree in one descriptive character as essential to the existence of a republican form of government. This is representation. We do not admit a government to be even in its origin republican, unless it is instituted by representation; nor do we allow it to be so, unless its legislation is also founded upon representation.”[154]
I close this array, illustrative of opinion, with the words of Daniel Webster, in harmony with the rest:—
“Now, fellow-citizens, I will venture to state, in a few words, what I take these American political principles in substance to be. They consist, as I think, in the first place, in the establishment of popular governments on the basis of representation.… This representation is to be made as equal as circumstances will allow.”[155]
Then again, on another occasion, he said:—
“This is the true idea of a State. It is an organized government, representing the collected will of the people, as far as they see fit to invest that government with power.”[156]
Thus, at every stage, from the opening, when Otis announced the master principle, “Taxation without representation is Tyranny,” all along to Daniel Webster, we find “Representation” an essential element in the American definition of republican government.
4. From authoritative opinions I pass to public acts, which testify to the true idea of republican government. These are of two classes: first, by the United States, in their collective character; and, secondly, by the States individually.
Looking at the States in their collective character, we find that at the adoption of the National Constitution they refused to recognize any exclusion from the elective franchise on account of race or color. The Fathers knew too well the requirements of a republican government to sanction such exclusion. Recognizing Slavery as a transitory condition, soon to cease, they threw over it a careful oblivion; but they were none the less jealous of the rights of all freemen. The slave did not pay taxes, and, so far as he was a person and not property, he was part of the family of his master, by whom he was represented, so that in his case the commanding principle of the Revolution was not disturbed. But, becoming a freeman, the slave stepped at once within the pale of taxation, and therefore necessarily of representation,[Pg 189] since the two are inseparable. And this consideration was the guide to our fathers.
The Continental Congress refused point-blank to insert the word “white” in the Articles of Confederation. The question came up, June 25, 1778, on these words: “The free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” The delegates from South Carolina moved, in behalf of their State, to limit this guaranty to “free white inhabitants.” On the question of inserting the word “white,” eleven States voted,—two in favor of the insertion, one was divided, and eight were against it. South Carolina, not disheartened, made another attempt, by moving to add, after the words “the several States,” the further clause, “according to the law of such States respectively for the government of their own free white inhabitants,”—thus seeking again to limit the operation of the guaranty. This proposition was voted down by the same decisive majority of eight to three. And thus did our fathers testify to the right of representation without distinction of color. On other occasions, for successive years, they constantly gave the same testimony.
A resolution of Congress in April, 1783, seconded by the report of a Grand Committee, of which Mr. Jefferson was Chairman, in April, 1784, recommended an Amendment of the Articles of Confederation, whereby the war expenses should be apportioned among the several States according to “the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants,”—thus positively embracing colored persons. In the Act for the Temporary Government of the Territory “ceded or to be[Pg 190] ceded” to the United States, April 23, 1784, and drawn by Jefferson, the voters are declared to be the “free males of full age,” without distinction of color. In the famous Ordinance for the Government of the Northwestern Territory, drawn by Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts, adopted by the Confederation July 13, 1787, and then reënacted by our Congress after the adoption of the Constitution, the voters are declared to be “free male inhabitants of full age,”—again without distinction of color. Then came successive Acts of Congress for the government of Territories, where the rule in the Ordinance for the Northwestern Territory was followed, and there was no distinction of color. If this rule changed, it was only when the partakers in the Revolution and the authors of the Constitution ceased to exercise influence over public affairs. The testimony of the Fathers was constant, and it is only of this that I speak.
Turning from the States collectively, and looking at them individually, we find the same testimony. By the Constitution of New Hampshire, at the adoption of the National Constitution, the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant of each town and parish,” with certain qualifications, but without exclusion on account of color. By the Constitution of Massachusetts the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. Rhode Island, at the adoption of the Constitution, was under her original colonial charter, which provided for elections by “the major part of the freemen of the respective towns or places,” without distinction of color. Connecticut was likewise under her original colonial charter,[Pg 191] which also provided for elections by “the major part of the freemen of the respective towns, cities, and places,” without distinction of color. By the Constitution of New York the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant of full age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of New Jersey it was vested in “all inhabitants of this Colony of full age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of Pennsylvania it was vested in “every freeman of the full age of twenty-one years,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Declaration of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of Delaware it was announced that “every freeman, having sufficient evidence of a permanent common interest with and attachment to the community, hath a right of suffrage,” without distinction of color; and in the Constitution the suffrage was vested in “the freemen and inhabitants of the respective counties,” with certain specified exceptions, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of Maryland the suffrage was vested in “all freemen above twenty-one years of age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of North Carolina the suffrage was vested in “all freemen of the age of twenty-one years,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color; and this rule continued down to 1836, when the Constitution was amended, or rather, let me say, perverted. That eminent citizen, Judge Gaston, of North Carolina, in giving judgment at a later day, said: “It is a matter of universal notoriety, that free persons, without regard to color, claimed and exercised the[Pg 192] franchise.”[157] To these States I add Tennessee, which was carved out of North Carolina, and followed her benign example. Her Constitution, adopted in 1796, vested the suffrage in “every freeman of the age of twenty-one years,” with certain qualifications, but without distinction of color; and this rule continued down to the perversion of the Constitution in 1834. Mr. Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, once Postmaster General, is reported to have said that he was originally elected to Congress by the votes of colored persons, and I have heard Mr. John Bell make the same confession with regard to himself.
Virginia was inconsistent and uncandid. By the Declaration of Rights prefixed to her Constitution it was announced that “all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage,” without distinction of color; and it is added, that they “cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.” This was entirely worthy of the eminent citizens who adorned that State. But a subsequent provision of the Constitution preserved the right of suffrage “as exercised at present”: thus embodying, without naming, the legislative exclusion of free negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, “although such persons be freeholders.” This discreditable manœuvre becomes more notable in view of an incident in the early history of Virginia, curious and important, and also applicable to all the States during their colonial existence. It was on the enactment of a statute in 1723, “that no free negro, mulatto, or[Pg 193] Indian whatsoever shall hereafter have any vote at the election of burgesses, or any other election whatsoever,”[158] when the tyranny here manifest was rebuked with unexpected plainness. The legal authority in England, to whom this colonial statute was submitted for review and approval, reported, in admirable words:—
“I cannot see why one freeman should be used worse than another merely upon account of his complexion.… To vote at elections of officers, either for a county or parish, &c., is incident to every freeman who is possessed of a certain amount of property.”[159]
Georgia was fitful. By her Constitution of 1777, in existence immediately anterior to the National Constitution, suffrage was confined to “male white inhabitants.” But a Constitution adopted May 6, 1789, and another adopted May 30, 1798, accorded suffrage to “citizens and inhabitants,” with certain specified qualifications, but without the word “white.”
It only remains to speak of South Carolina, the persistent marplot of republican institutions, where, by the Constitution, the suffrage was vested in “every free white man, and no other person,” with certain specified qualifications. This was the only State among the original Thirteen, unless Georgia be grouped with South Carolina, which at that time allowed a color discrimination in its Constitution. It was the only State which, after uniting in a National Declaration that “all men are created equal,” openly and audaciously commenced[Pg 194] the example of “a white man’s government.” This apostate idea, which has since played such a part as a disturber of the national peace, was then and there born, as the opposite idea was born in Massachusetts, under the inspiring words of James Otis. And the other States, in their Constitutions, followed this patriot voice. They spoke of “persons,” “inhabitants,” “freemen,” or, better still, “men,” without prefix of “white.” Color was not mentioned. But even in South Carolina, which introduced the discreditable tyranny into her Constitution, this exclusion was more apparent than real. In point of fact, even as late as 1790, when the first census was taken, there were in this State only one thousand eight hundred and one free colored citizens. Of course their exclusion was wrong, mean, and unrepublican; but I do not assert that it was such a case as to justify the interference of the nation to reform it, especially where there was no lapse of the State Government. On the other hand, its sufferance cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the principles for which the Revolution was fought. But even in South Carolina there had been a spasm of virtue. In 1757 there was a “flourishing negro school” at Charleston, and in 1709 we find a complaint that “even negroes” had been admitted to vote. Though denounced as an abuse, the precedent is authenticated by a disgusted inhabitant.[160]
Such are the public acts of the States, collectively and individually, at the adoption of the National Constitution, illustrating with rare harmony the American idea of a Republic, and testifying against any exclusion[Pg 195] founded on color. Add to these, that the National Constitution, carefully excepting from the basis of Representation “Indians not taxed,” pays open homage to the principle that there can be no taxation without representation; add then that it expressly founds the Government upon “the people,” not only in the preamble, which begins “We the people,” but also in providing that the House of Representatives shall be “chosen by the people of the several States”; add also the crowning fact, that it recognizes no distinction of color, that it treats all with the same impartial justice, that the word “white” does not appear there, and who are we, Sir, who dare foist into this Magna Charta an oligarchical idea which finds no sanction in its republican text?
Here I bring this part of the argument to a close. We have seen the origin of the controversy which led to the Revolution, when Otis, with such solid claim, insisted upon Equal Rights, and then, giving practical effect to the grand demand, sounded the battle-cry, “Taxation without Representation is Tyranny”; we have followed the controversy in its anxious stages, where these principles were constantly asserted and constantly denied, until it broke forth in battle; we have seen these principles adopted as the very frontlet of the Republic, when it assumed its place in the family of nations, and then again when it ordained its Constitution; we have seen them avowed and illustrated in memorable words by the greatest authorities of our history; lastly, we have seen them embodied in public acts of the States collectively and individually; and now, out of this concurring, cumulative, and unimpeachable testimony,[Pg 196] constituting a speaking aggregation absolutely without precedent, I offer you the American definition of a Republican form of government. In vain do you cite philosophers or publicists, or the examples of former history. Against these I put the early and constant postulates of the Fathers, the corporate declarations of the Fathers, the avowed opinions of the Fathers, and the public acts of the Fathers, all with one voice proclaiming, first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed; and here is the American idea of a Republic, which must be adopted in the interpretation of the National Constitution. You cannot reject it. As well reject the Decalogue in determining moral duties, or reject the multiplication-table in determining a question of arithmetic.
Counter to this irresistible conclusion there can be only one suggestion having any seeming plausibility, and this is founded on the contemporary recognition of Slavery. On this point, it is enough, if I remind you, first, that our fathers did not recognize Slavery as a permanent part of our system, but treated it as exceptional and transitory, while they concealed it from view by words which might mean something else; secondly, that the slave was always regarded, legally and politically, as part of the family of his master, according to the nomenclature of Blackstone’s Commentaries, much read at the time, where master and servant are grouped with husband and wife, parent and child, and, as in the case of wife and child, the slave is represented by the head of the family, who also paid taxes on his account, so that in his case the cardinal principle of the Revolution, associating representation and taxation together,[Pg 197] was not essentially violated; and, thirdly, that by the acts of the Continental Congress, and generally by the State Constitutions, all distinction of color was discarded in determining the elective franchise, and that illustrious expounders of the National Constitution, as if anticipating the very question before us, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, announced in the “Federalist,” if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. Such was the understanding, and such the promise, at the adoption of the Constitution. Such was the declared meaning of our fathers, according to the concurrent contemporary testimony of Hamilton and Madison. Therefore, while confessing sorrowfully the terrible inconsistency in recognizing Slavery, and throwing over their shame the mantle which the son of Noah threw over his father, we must reject every argument or inference on this account against the true idea of a Republic, which is none other than a government where all citizens have an equal voice. As Washington, by divine example, gave to mankind a new idea of political greatness, so did the Fathers, by inspired teaching, give to mankind a new idea of Government. Do you ask again for authority? I offer it in its many forms. It is the early Vocabulary of James Otis, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Benjamin Franklin; it is the Dictionary of the Revolution; it is the Lexicon of our National History; it is the Thesaurus of Public Acts. This new idea was the great discovery of our fathers. Rob them of this, and you take their highest title to gratitude. Columbus, venturing into an unknown sea, discovered[Pg 198] a New World of Space; but our fathers, venturing likewise, discovered a New World of Public Duty. It is for us, their children, to profit by their discovery.
For determining the meaning of our own Constitution in a momentous requirement without precedent, American authority and example are enough; but I would not have you forget that the conclusion on which I rest is grandly sustained by France. Here I shall be brief.
I cannot begin with a higher name than Montaigne, who, though never defining a Republic, let drop words which, coming from such a master, are invaluable:—
“Popular rule seems to me the most natural and equitable.” “Equality is the first part of equity.”[161]
In the same spirit, Montesquieu, while failing to supply a precise definition, helped to elevate the idea of republican government, when he declared “virtue” its inspiration, and that virtue is the love of equality.[162] A kindred thought is expressed by a publicist of our time, in a remarkable study on Montesquieu, when he says, that “the true principle of democracy is justice.”[163] But justice is equality.
Contemporary with Montesquieu was the Marquis d’Argenson, a minister of Louis the Fifteenth and the friend of Voltaire. In a work written as early as 1739, but not seeing the light till 1764, some time after his death, when it was attributed to Rousseau, this remarkable character gives utterance to words worthy of perpetual memory:—
“It is only necessary to lay aside the most stupid prejudice, to admit that two things are chiefly to be desired for the good of the State: one, that all the citizens shall be equal among themselves; the other, that each shall be the son of his works.”[164]
A government where these two things are assured would be a Republic indeed.
Voltaire, though not professing to define a Republic, taught its dependence upon equality:—
“Civil government is the will of all, executed by one or by many in virtue of laws for which all have voted.” “The republican is undoubtedly the most tolerable of all governments, because it is that which brings men most nearly to natural equality.”[165]
In another place the same illustrious teacher said:—
“The people never desire, and never can desire, anything but Liberty and Equality.”[166]
Advancing in time, the Republic becomes more manifest. Omitting the fervid words of Jean Jacques Rousseau, I adduce Condorcet, whose consecration to truth was sealed by a tragical death:—
“I have ever thought that a Republican Constitution, having Equality for its basis, was the only one in conformity with Nature, with reason, and with justice,—the only one which could preserve the liberty of the citizens and the dignity of the human race.”[167]
Belonging to the ancient system of France, and, like Lafayette, with the rank of Marquis, Condorcet, again like Lafayette, not only accepted the Republic, but declared its true basis.
Another French authority, of eminent experience in diplomacy, who wrote coldly and only according to the requirement of reason, Gérard de Rayneval, asserts the same law of Equality:—
“Political Liberty consists in the right to participate in public affairs. This participation is direct or indirect, and it is more or less extended according to the form of government. It is, then, necessarily unequal. For example, in a Democracy all the citizens participate in the legislative power. If they delegate it, they have only a very indirect part in it; but all can become delegates or representatives, all can arrive at administrative employments, and all have the right to protest against abuses. In aristocratic republics political liberty is exclusively concentrated in the body of Notables; they alone exercise all the power; subjects have only civil liberty.”[168]
Such, in France, is the voice of political science.
It is also the voice of the French Revolution. The one idea which that great event taught with prevailing influence was the Equal Rights of All, explained and defined by the new-born formula, that “all are equal before the Law.” Napoleon recognized the supremacy of this principle, when, in an official address to the Council of State, he said, “France loves Equality above everything”;[169] and he sought to enforce it, when, in an early proclamation, he declared, “Let there be no head[Pg 201] which does not bend under the empire of Equality.”[170] Such is human inconsistency, that shortly afterwards his own ambition refused to bend under this empire, which none the less disowned the sceptre he assumed and the nobles he created. But the great truth, though trampled down, survived in the hearts of the French people, to rise again and resume its heritage.
As the Provisional Government of 1848 proclaimed the Republic, it was careful, after proper deliberation, to proclaim at the same time “universal suffrage,” which Lamartine, standing on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville, and speaking in the name of the Government, said was “the first truth and only basis of every National Republic.”[171] This proclamation was itself submitted to the vote of “all the citizens”; and on the terms of this submission another member of the Government, of solid sense and perfect fidelity, thus expresses himself:—
“By these words—all the citizens—the Provisional Government intended to consecrate definitively the fundamental principle of democracy; it intended to proclaim boldly and forever the inalienable, imprescriptible right inherent in each member of society to participate directly in the government of his country; it intended to put in practice really and loyally the great principles hitherto shut up in the domain of the abstract theories of philosophy.”[172]
The same person, M. Garnier-Pagès, who was at once an eminent actor in these scenes and their most authentic historian, thus again dwells on the true idea of a Republic:—
“The Republic, that government of all by all, where each has his place, his duty, and his right; the Republic, that is to say, Liberty itself, the liberty to do every act and to give utterance to every thought not prejudicial to others; the Republic, that fraternal ground where are admitted all parties, the representatives of the past as well as of the future, where all minds, all associations, can have free scope.”[173]
This precise definition is fitly crowned by the remarkable words revealing the soul of De Tocqueville:—
“I should, I think, have loved Liberty at all times, but in the times in which we live I feel inclined to adore it.… There is no legislator sufficiently wise and sufficiently powerful to maintain free institutions, if he does not take Equality for first principle and symbol. All our contemporaries, then, who would create or assure the independence and dignity of their fellow-men, must show themselves the friends of Equality; and the only worthy way of showing themselves such is to be so. Upon this depends the success of their holy enterprise.”[174]
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