Saturday, January 4, 2025

The End of New Deal Liberalism, by William Greider, exactly 14 years ago

Bill Greider was the former national affairs editor at Rolling Stone, who left us in December 2019. The man was a prophet — from exactly 14 years ago:

The End of New Deal Liberalism
By William Greider
The Nation, January 5, 2011 
(reposted by Physicians for a National Health Program)

We have reached a pivotal moment in government and politics, and it feels like the last, groaning spasms of New Deal liberalism. When the party of activist government, faced with an epic crisis, will not use government’s extensive powers to reverse the economic disorders and heal deepening social deterioration, then it must be the end of the line for the governing ideology inherited from Roosevelt, Truman and Johnson.

Political events of the past two years have delivered a more profound and devastating message: American democracy has been conclusively conquered by American capitalism. Government has been disabled or captured by the formidable powers of private enterprise and concentrated wealth. Self-governing rights that representative democracy conferred on citizens are now usurped by the overbearing demands of corporate and financial interests. Collectively, the corporate sector has its arms around both political parties, the financing of political careers, the production of the policy agendas and propaganda of influential think tanks, and control of most major media.

What the capitalist system wants is more—more wealth, more freedom to do whatever it wishes. This has always been its instinct, unless government intervened to stop it. The objective now is to destroy any remaining forms of government interference, except of course for business subsidies and protections. Many elected representatives are implicitly enlisted in the cause.

A lot of Americans seem to know this; at least they sense that the structural reality of government and politics is not on their side. When the choice comes down to society or capitalism, society regularly loses. First attention is devoted to the economic priorities of the largest, most powerful institutions of business and finance. The bias comes naturally to Republicans, the party of money and private enterprise, but on the big structural questions business-first also defines Democrats, formerly the party of working people. Despite partisan rhetoric, the two parties are more alike than they acknowledge.

In these terms, the administration of Barack Obama has been a crushing disappointment for those of us who hoped he would be different. It turns out Obama is a more conventional and limited politician than advertised, more right-of-center than his soaring rhetoric suggested. Most Congressional Democrats, likewise, proved weak and incoherent, unreliable defenders of their supposed values or most loyal constituencies. They call it pragmatism. I call it surrender.

Obama’s maladroit tax compromise with Republicans was more destructive than creative. He acceded to the trickle-down doctrine of regressive taxation and skipped lightly over the fact that he was contributing further to stark injustices. Ordinary Americans will again be made to pay, one way or another, for the damage others did to society. Obama agrees that this is offensive but argues, This is politics, get over it. His brand of realism teaches people to disregard what he says. Look instead at what he does.

With overwhelming majorities in Congress and economic crisis tearing up the country in 2009, incumbent Democrats opted for self-protection first, party principles later. Their Senate leaders allowed naysayers to determine the lowest common denominator for reform—halfway measures designed not to overly disturb powerful corporate-financial interests, and therefore not able to repair the social destruction those interests had wrought. Senate Democrats say they didn’t have the votes. Imagine what Mitch McConnell would have done if he were their leader: Take no prisoners. Force party dissenters to get in line and punish those who don’t. Block even the most pedestrian opposition proposals.

Democrats are not used to governing aggressively. They haven’t done so for decades, and they may no longer believe in it. For many years, incumbent Democrats survived by managing a precarious straddle between the forces of organized money and the disorganized people they claim to represent. The split was usually lopsided in favor of the money guys, but one could believe that the reform spirit would come alive once they were back in power with a Democratic president. That wishful assumption is now defunct.

Obama’s timid economic strategy can be described as successful only if the standard of success is robust corporate profits, rising stock prices and the notorious year-end bonuses of Wall Street. Again and again, Obama hesitated to take the bolder steps that would have made differences in social conditions. Now it is clear that the bleeding afflictions experienced by the overwhelming majority of citizens will not be substantively addressed because Democrats, both president and Congress, have chosen to collaborate in the conservative cause of deficit reduction: cut spending, shrink government, block any healing initiatives that cost real money.

Republicans, armed with strong conviction, are resurgent with what amounts to ideological nihilism. Leave aside their obvious hypocrisies on fiscal rectitude and free markets. Their single-minded objective is to destroy what remains of government’s capacity to intervene in or restrain the private sector on behalf of the common welfare. Many of government’s old tools and programs are already gone, gutted by deregulation, crippled by corporate capture of the regulatory agencies originally intended to curb private-sector abuses and starved by inadequate funding. The right wants smaller government for the people, but not for corporate capitalism. It will fight to preserve the protections, privileges and subsidies that flow to the private sector.


Once again, Republicans are mounting an assault on liberalism’s crown jewel, Social Security, only this time they might succeed, because the Democratic president is collaborating with them. The deficit hysteria aimed at Social Security is fraudulent (as Obama’s own experts acknowledge), but the president has already gravely weakened the program’s solvency with his payroll-tax holiday, which undercuts financing for future benefits. Obama promises the gimmick won’t be repeated, but if employment is still weak a year from now, he may well cave. The GOP will accuse him of damaging the economy by approving a “tax increase” on all workers. Senate Democrats are preparing their own proposal to cut Social Security as a counter to the GOP’s extreme version. In the end, they can split the difference and celebrate another great compromise.

This is capitulation posing as moderation. Obama has set himself up to make many more “compromises” in the coming months; each time, he will doubtless use the left as a convenient foil. Disparaging “purist” liberals is his way of assuring so-called independents that he stood up to the allegedly far-out demands of his own electoral base. This is a ludicrous ploy, given the weakness of the left. It cynically assumes ordinary people not engaged in politics are too dim to grasp what he’s doing. I suspect Obama is mistaken. I asked an old friend what she makes of the current mess in Washington. “Whatever the issue, the rich guys win,” she responded. Lots of people understand this—it is the essence of the country’s historic predicament.

To get a rough glimpse of what the corporate state looks like, study the Federal Reserve’s list of banking, finance and business firms that received the $3.3 trillion the central bank dispensed in low-interest loans during the financial crisis (this valuable information is revealed only because reform legislators like Senator Bernie Sanders fought for disclosure). If you were not on the list of recipients, you know your place in this new order.

The power shift did not start with Obama, but his tenure confirms and completes it. The corporates began their systematic drive to dismantle liberal governance back in the 1970s, and the Democratic Party was soon trying to appease them, its retreat whipped along by Ronald Reagan’s popular appeal and top-down tax cutting. So long as Democrats were out of power, they could continue to stand up for liberal objectives and assail the destructive behavior of business and finance (though their rhetoric was more consistent than their voting record). Once back in control of government, they lowered their voices and sued for peace. Beholden to corporate America for campaign contributions, the Democrats cut deals with banks and businesses and usually gave them what they demanded, so corporate interests would not veto progressive legislation.

Obama has been distinctively candid about this. He admires the “savvy businessmen” atop the pinnacle of corporate power. He seeks “partnership” with them. The old economic conflicts, like labor versus capital, are regarded as passé by the “new Democrats” now governing. The business of America is business. Government should act as steward and servant, not master.

This deferential attitude is reflected in all of Obama’s major reform legislation, not to mention in the people he brought into government. In the financial rescue, Obama, like George W. Bush before him, funneled billions to the troubled bankers without demanding any public obligations in return. On healthcare, he cut deals with insurance and drug companies and played cute by allowing the public option, which would have provided real competition to healthcare monopolists, to be killed. On financial reform, Obama’s Treasury lieutenants and a majority of the Congressional Dems killed off the most important measures, which would have cut Wall Street megabanks down to tolerable size.

Society faces dreadful prospects and profound transformation. When both parties are aligned with corporate power, who will stand up for the people? Who will protect them from the insatiable appetites of capitalist enterprise and help them get through the hard passage ahead? One thing we know for sure from history: there is no natural limit to what capitalism will seek in terms of power and profit. If government does not stand up and apply the brakes, society is defenseless.

Strangely enough, this new reality brings us back to the future, posing fundamental questions about the relationship between capitalism and democracy that citizens and reformers asked 100 years ago. Only this time, the nation is no longer an ascendant economic power. It faces hard adjustments as general prosperity recedes and the broad middle class that labor and liberalism helped create is breaking apart.

My bleak analysis is not the end of the story. Change is hard to visualize now, given the awesome power of the status quo and the collapse of once-trusted political institutions. But change will come, for better or worse. One key dynamic of the twentieth century was the long-running contest for dominance between democracy and capitalism. The balance of power shifted back and forth several times, driven by two basic forces that neither corporate lobbyists nor timid politicians could control: the calamitous events that disrupted the social order, such as war and depression, and the power of citizens mobilized in reaction to those events. In those terms, both political parties are still highly vulnerable—as twentieth-century history repeatedly demonstrated, society cannot survive the burdens of an unfettered corporate order.

People are given different ideological labels, but Americans are not as opposed to “big government” as facile generalizations suggest. On many issues, there is overwhelming consensus that media and pundits ignore (check the polls, if you doubt this). Americans of all ages will fight to defend social protections—Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, among others. People are skeptical to hostile about the excessive power of corporations. People want government to be more aggressive in many areas—like sending some of the financial malefactors to prison.

One vivid example was the angry citizen at a town hall meeting who shouted at his Congressman: “Keep your government hands off my Medicare!” I heard a grassroots leader on the radio explain that basically the Tea Party people “want government that works for them.” Don’t we all? In the next few years, both parties will try to define this sentiment. If they adhere to the corporate agenda, they are bound to get in trouble, and the ranks of insurgent citizens will grow. Nobody can know where popular rebellion might lead, right or left, but my own stubborn optimism hangs by that thread.

Whatever people on the left may call themselves, they have a special burden in this situation because they are deeply committed to the idea that government should be the trustworthy agent of the many, not the powerful few. Many of us believe further (as the socialists taught) that the economy should serve the people, not the other way around.

The current crisis requires people to go back to their roots and re-examine their convictions—now that they can no longer count automatically on the helping hand of government or the Democratic Party. Obama’s unfortunate “hostage” metaphor led Saturday Night Live to joke that the president was himself experiencing the “Stockholm syndrome”—identifying with his conservative captors. Many progressive groups, including organized labor, suffer a similar dependency. They will not be able to think clearly about the future of the country until they get greater distance from the Democratic Party.

I suggest three steps for progressives to recover an influential role in politics. First, develop a guerrilla sensibility that recognizes the weakness of the left. There’s no need to resign from electoral politics, but dedicated lefties should stake out a role of principled resistance. In the 1960s uncompromising right-wingers became known as “ankle biters” in Republican ranks, insisting on what were considered impossible goals and opposing moderate and liberal party leaders, sometimes with hopeless candidates. They spent twenty years in the wilderness but built a cadre of activists whose convictions eventually gained power.

Where are the left-wing ankle biters who might change the Democratic Party? It takes a bit of arrogance to imagine that your activities can change the country, but, paradoxically, it also requires a sense of humility. Above all, it forces people to ask themselves what they truly believe the country needs—and then stand up for those convictions any way they can. Concretely, that may lead someone to run for city council or US senator. Or field principled opponents to challenge feckless Democrats in primaries (that’s what the Tea Party did to Republicans, with impressive results). Or activist agitators may simply reach out to young people and recruit kindred spirits for righteous work that requires long-term commitment.

Second, people of liberal persuasion should “go back to school” and learn the new economic realities. In my experience, many on the left do not really understand the internal dynamics of capitalism—why it is productive, why it does so much damage (many assumed government and politicians would do the hard thinking for them). We need a fundamental re-examination of capitalism and the relationship between the state and the private sphere. This will not be done by business-financed think tanks. We have to do it for ourselves.

A century ago the populist rebellion organized farmer cooperatives, started dozens of newspapers and sent out lecturers to spread the word. Socialists and the labor movement did much the same. Modern Americans cannot depend on the Democratic Party or philanthropy to sponsor small-d democracy. We have to do it. But we have resources and modern tools—including the Internet—those earlier insurgents lacked.

The New Deal order broke down for good reasons—the economic system changed, and government did not adjust to new realities or challenge the counterattack from the right in the 1970s. The structure of economic life has changed again—most dramatically by globalization—yet the government and political parties are largely clueless about how to deal with the destruction of manufacturing and the loss of millions of jobs. Government itself has been weakened in the process, but politicians are too intimidated to talk about restoring its powers. The public expresses another broad consensus on the need to confront “free trade” and change it in the national interest—another instance of public opinion not seeming to count, since it opposes the corporate agenda.

Reformers today face conditions similar to what the Populists and Progressives faced: monopoly capitalism, a labor movement suppressed with government’s direct assistance, Wall Street’s “money trust” on top, the corporate state feeding off government while ignoring immoral social conditions. The working class, meanwhile, is regaining its identity, as millions are being dispossessed of middle-class status while millions of others struggle at the bottom. Working people are poised to become the new center of a reinvigorated democracy, though it is not clear at this stage whether they will side with the left or the right. Understanding all these forces can lead to the new governing agenda society desperately needs.

Finally, left-liberals need to start listening and learning—talking up close to ordinary Americans, including people who are not obvious allies. We should look for viable connections with those who are alienated and unorganized, maybe even ideologically hostile. The Tea Party crowd got one big thing right: the political divide is not Republicans against Democrats but governing elites against the people. A similar division exists within business and banking, where the real hostages are the smaller, community-scale firms imperiled by the big boys getting the gravy from Washington. We have more in common with small-business owners and Tea Party insurgents than the top-down commentary suggests.

Somewhere in all these activities, people can find fulfilling purpose again and gradually build a new politics. Don’t wait for Barack Obama to send instructions. And don’t count on necessarily making much difference, at least not right away. The music in democracy starts with people who take themselves seriously. They first discover they have changed themselves, then decide they can change others.

https://www.thenation.com…

Thursday, January 2, 2025

John Kenneth Galbraith - The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt (August 1956)

The Study of Man: On the Economics of F.D.R.

John Kenneth Galbraith reviews Daniel R. Fusfeld's The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commentary magazine, August 1956


A young Columbia University scholar, Mr. Daniel R. Fusfeld, who is now on the faculty of Hofstra College, has just completed a careful investigation of the economic ideas to which Franklin D. Roosevelt was exposed in school and college and in the years prior to his becoming President—The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Historians, the author regretfully points out, are taking a very poor view of F.D.R.’s economic knowledge. They tend to conclude, as a result, that his economic program was based on extensive improvisation or even downright opportunism. Evidence to support the point has come not only from Roosevelt’s enemies, who have jubilantly proven that he knew less than nothing about anything, but also from his friends. Frances Perkins, for example, has said that Roosevelt did not read much in economics, and she has also told of the reciprocal bewilderment which afflicted the principals after the famous meeting between J. M. (later Lord) Keynes and Roosevelt in 1934. Keynes was distressed that Roosevelt was not “more literate, economically speaking,” while Roosevelt hazarded the puzzled guess that Keynes “must be a mathematician rather than a political economist.”
Mr. Fusfeld comes strongly to the defense of Roosevelt’s economic education and his knowledge of economics. (He notes that a lot of professional economists were baffled by Keynes in the 30’s.) Except on the matter of what to do about depressions—a rather critical weakness but a common one in those days—Roosevelt’s “views on basic economic matters were well-articulated.” His general economic philosophy led quite directly to his political program. Building on the much discussed noblesse oblige which is now supposed to be part of the Roosevelt, and I gather also the Hudson Valley, tradition, F.D.R. had a sound general education including a liberal training in economics at Harvard. Mr. Fusfeld attributes a good deal to the influence of Professor W. Z. Ripley.
Ripley was the great authority of his time on corporations and railroads and he had the most exact and extensive knowledge of high corporate skullduggery of any man of his generation. It is easy, in the light of F.D.R.’s later attitudes, to suppose that he was influenced by Ripley, always assuming that he went to classes as he should. Roosevelt had a further education in Wilsonian liberalism, and more specifically in labor relations, while Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I. All of this came before the opportunity to read and reflect which was a by-product of his attack of polio, and to which biographers have always attached much significance. Mr. Fusfeld thinks they have greatly exaggerated its importance. Finally, there was the rich experience in the farm, welfare, conservation, and power problems of the state of New York, and the knowledge that came from the peculiarly talented group of people on which, as governor, Roosevelt drew. Roosevelt went to Washington, in Mr. Fusfeld’s view, with a very good working knowledge of economics indeed.
It seems to me that Mr. Fusfeld has made his case about as well as anyone could. He is an economist and has known what to look for, and he has researched his material competently and well. Yet I find myself unpersuaded and so, I think, will quite a number of readers. There is a closely related and even more interesting question, which is how much knowledge of economics a man must have to be a good President.
Mr. Fusfeld does not say what he means by a “well-articulated” approach to economic problems, but I assume, at a minimum, it means that the individual has a set of controlling ideas which he brings to bear on the specific facts of any situation. Given the facts, his reactions then will be tolerably certain and predictable. We like people who are so supplied with a basic working theory: it enables us to type them as conservative, liberal, Keynesian, Marxian, or whatever, and this is convenient and comforting. It enables us also to make further in-grade distinctions—as between sound and extreme Keynesians, ordinary and rabid conservatives, good liberals and poor liberals—except that now, I believe, almost any liberal is likely to be called a confused liberal. In politics these categories also give us some feeling of certainty as to how a man will react after he has been elected. If a man has well-developed economic ideas, even though they may be unpalatable, we pay him the compliment of saying that we know where he stands.
Yet some doubts about the value of such well-formed views begin to emerge when we think back to the 1932 election. No one, and incidentally not Mr. Fusfeld, would go so far as to suggest that Roosevelt’s economic views were nearly as well articulated as Mr. Hoover’s. Mr. Hoover knew where he stood, and the American people knew where he stood. He believed that the responsibility for the well-being of the American people rested not with the Federal government, but with the people themselves or with their local governments. He was not at all impressed by the argument that modern capitalism, especially the rise of large corporate units, had removed from the people (and also from local and state governments) the power to work out their salvation at home. If the Federal government would balance the budget, strongly affirm its intentions to remain on the gold standard, keep the bureaucrats on leash, and leave private enterprise to its own resources, things would get better. There might be suffering, but there would be less than under any other arrangement. Mr. Hoover had said all of these things with clarity and sincerity. There was no similar blueprint of Roosevelt’s views; even today nothing could be said about them within similar compass.
Yet Mr. Hoover’s economic policy has not had a great deal more sympathy from the historians than it had from the contemporary voters. In fact, it stands, like Wilson’s League of Nations, as one of the flat failures of the century and without the redeeming quality of seeming to have been a good try. The economic policy of Roosevelt was not a prompt, immediate, and widespread success. But its reputation as a vast step forward is completely secure.
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Someone before now will have wanted to plead that there are economic systems and economic systems, and that Mr. Hoover’s, however well-developed, was singularly ill-adapted both to the temper and economic situation of 1932. That it was ill-adapted can be agreed, but the availability of alternative systems is less than clear. In 1932 respectable economic opinion was all on Mr. Hoover’s side. The cranks, crackpots, eccentrics, and the vaguely irresponsible talked about cutting loose from gold, having a big bond issue to alleviate unemployment, of the need for some kind of national planning, or of the possible virtues of something like the Domestic Allotment Plan for agriculture. These were not the ideas of the men of established reputation. Had Roosevelt affiliated himself too obviously with the cranks in 1932, his contemporary reputation as a man of economic sense would have suffered. (Many looked askance at his flirtation with the monetary ideas of Professor George F. Warren of Cornell.) On the other hand, if Roosevelt had mastered and accepted the ideas of the men of established reputation, his views would not have been different from those of Mr. Hoover.
It has always been my feeling that Roosevelt would have been much happier had he been able just once to balance the Federal budget. While the Keynesian thesis that the times called for a deficit was almost incredibly convenient, it is my hunch that he regarded it as another of the rationalizations which his advisers, in the tradition of their master, were exceptionally skilled at providing. The belief in the balanced budget, if it existed, was the residue of some past exposure to economics. Had the latter been more extensive and penetrating it would also have left a deeper feeling for the gold standard, a dislike for monkeying with the price system, a suspicion of the monopolistic potentialities of unions, and any number of taboos of which, in fact, F.D.R. was blessedly free.
In May of 1932, in a speech at Oglethorpe University in Georgia which is quoted by Mr. Fusfeld, Roosevelt said: “The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands, bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.” (Roosevelt subsequently adhered to the first rule of politics, which is never to concede an error. Your opponents are never gracious about such concessions. On the contrary, they hasten to point out that you have even admitted yourself that it was all wrong.) This was the voice of unabashed empiricism. It denied the existence of a controlling view of events. But in the context of 1932 it was greatly to be preferred to a systematic economic doctrine. Such a doctrine was certain to be wrong.
Economics is in a far better way now than it was in the early 30’s. In the latter part of that decade, under the combined stimulus of the depression, Keynes’s General Theory, and the new system of social accounts (which gave us the now familiar Gross National Product, National Income, and their components, and enabled us for the first time to have a sense of total economic performance), economics had a great renaissance and this carried on through the war years. Of late there has been a recurrence of the relative stagnation of economic thought which is endemic in times of opulence, but it is unlikely that it has yet carried the subject to the extremes of irrelevance that characterized the late 20’s and early 30’s. One can more safely set store by economic knowledge now than then. I still doubt if a President or any high administrator should be controlled, as was Mr. Hoover, by too many fixed views. There must still be a general and pragmatic willingness to adapt to circumstances.
Proof of the point lies in the number of recent economic and political errors which can be traced to efforts to adhere to seemingly impeccable principle when the circumstances suggested a different course. In 1946 the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of that year, which provided the postwar loan of $3.75 billions to Britain, specified that Britain would make sterling convertible into dollars on current account in accordance with a time-table laid down in the agreement. The fact of a serious and perhaps not too readily curable lopsidedness in Britain’s balance of payments was clear, but it was passed over. The great and nostalgic principle of convertibility was sacrosanct. It must control at all cost. In the end, convertibility was proclaimed on schedule. The proceeds of the loan were dissipated in a windfall gain to alert holders of sterling in a few weeks’ time, and then sterling became inconvertible again. It was one of the most fantastically expensive episodes in recent history.
The Eisenhower administration made its most foolish economic blunder in 1953 under the influence of the theory, which had attained the standing of a cliché in financial quarters, that the New and Fair Deals had gone much too far in depressing interest rates. A series of abrupt increases in early 1953, for which there was no circumstantial justification, had a decidedly unsettling effect on business. The policy had to be abandoned and reversed. It was the deathless principle that TVA is creeping socialism, and that private utilities should produce all possible power regardless of circumstances, that led to the recent fiasco of Dixon-Yates.
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None of this argues either that economic theory is unuseful or that a President should be without convictions on economic matters. We know a good deal about economic behavior, and most of it is the result of the effort to develop applicable generalizations. The trouble is that the generalizations are not in themselves a complete guide to action. They must be tested against the circumstances of the particular situation. Perhaps there were times—had he been President in 1920-21, for example—when Mr. Hoover’s belief in the self-corrective character of depressions and the wisdom of a hands-off policy would have been, if not ideal, at least possible. But a generalization that was appropriate for mild depressions was intolerable for a grave one. Only by an open-minded testing of the theory against the new facts could grave error be avoided. But here is the rub. It can probably be put down as a rule that acceptance of an economic position and an open-minded testing of its applicability are incompatible. The choice, under these circumstances, had better lie with open-mindedness.
This, as I have suggested, does not argue against conviction. There is still need for a definite attitude on economic problems. On this more general level we know that Roosevelt reacted favorably to economic change. He also regarded the government as a natural instrument for effecting change. He saw no special virtue in big business and did not regard successful businessmen as a special repository of skill or knowledge. He was not a Jeffersonian, although he was pleased to regard himself as one, but he was certainly not a Hamiltonian. He regarded the country in its physical aspect as a kind of estate to be improved, beautified, and conserved for those who would possess it later. None of these attitudes implies of itself deep and precise economic knowledge. It did, however, make his reaction to particular circumstances broadly predictable.
Thus, faced with, say, the agricultural depression, it was inevitable that Roosevelt would be disposed to positive government action, quite apart from the political pressures of the case. He would not suppose that the head of International Harvester or of Swift and Company was the man to call on for help. On the other hand, he would not be clear about what to do himself. He would be open to advice and suggestions.
At times, in defending F.D.R.’s economics, it seems to me that Mr. Fusfeld himself is really defending his general attitude toward economic problems. It is this, and not specific positions, that seems to me important. To cite another recent example, Mrs. Hobby did not get into her terrible troubles with the Salk vaccine as the result of inadequate medical knowledge. Her difficulty was an attitude toward her department which kept her from seeing, much less welcoming, an opportunity to put it fully at the service of the people.
As with medicine so with economics. There will always be a doctor in the house.